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mechanism · §3.1

libidinal surplus

the platform's accumulated yield, decomposed by register

One of the six instruments (§3.1). The platform's accumulated yield over horizon T is given by the marked point process in equation (5): . The per-register decomposition is what gives the instrument its analytic power: the policy distributes extraction across registers to maximize joint long-run yield, and the distribution is observable — the temporal density of register-marks in any user's engagement stream estimates the policy's extraction priorities.

Σ_S · Subject(school / archive)4.80(16.2%)
Σ_C · Citizen(press / parliament)6.20(20.9%)
Σ_P · Person(church / family)3.90(13.2%)
Σ_K · Consumer(marketplace)14.70(49.7%)
total Σ(T) = 29.60 (units of accumulated reward)
§3.1. Each bar is one register's accumulated surplus — the platform's yield from extraction events marked with that register. Under the converged regime the distribution is sharply unequal — the policy concentrates extraction where per-register yield is highest. Under Mode A intervention, total surplus drops and the distribution flattens; the architectural change costs the platform absolute yield.

what to look for

At baseline the four registers extract roughly equally — pre-closure apparatuses were not jointly optimized. Step to converged and the distribution skews sharply: the Consumer register dominates the yield because the policy has learned where extraction kernels integrate most.

Switch to — Mode A — and total drops substantially. The architectural intervention costs the platform measurable yield; the per-register distribution also flattens because the modified policy fires less and the cross-excitation that concentrated extraction has less to work on. This is the quantitative content of Mode A's antagonism with engagement competition: under voluntary conditions, the platform that adopts it loses against the platform that doesn't.